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SYMPOSIUM
THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE IMPACT OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
FOREWORD
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
T is a welcome development that the law of lawyering has received
the concentrated attention expressed in the papers presented in
this symposium. The law of lawyering has evolved over the last two
decades from virtually a "non-subject"' to one that is not only of in-
tense interest to lawyers and law students, but also one of peculiar
complexity.
The law of lawyering has existed in Western society, in at least some
form, ever since the legal profession emerged as a distinct calling in
the eleventh or twelfth century. Paul Brand's excellent history of the
early English profession 2 explicates the efforts of the courts and of
Parliament to regulate lawyers. In the medieval era, the profession
primarily consisted of two groups: the serjeants and the attorneys.'
The serjeants, considered the elite of the profession, were the only
lawyers permitted to speak directly to judges and were essentially part
of the court rather than representatives of clients in the modern
sense.4 The primary function of attorneys-considered the "lower
branch" of the profession-was to "attend court in place of [their]
clients."' They thus directly represented clients.6
If the conduct of sergeants involved legal or ethical problems, there
is little record of it. There is, however, a substantial historical record
on the regulation of attorneys.7 Professor Jonathan Rose, building on
Mr. Brand's work, has recently published an illuminating study of the
efforts to control various forms of misconduct on the part of attor-
neys-conflict of interest, overcharging, delay, cheating clients, etc.,
Hence, we know that from an early date there was a law of lawyering,
at least for the lower branch of the profession.
1. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
2. Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession (1992).
3. See id. at 70-85.
4. See i at 94-105. The serjeants' function "was to 'serve' the whole of the
king's people and [they) came to take an oath that they would do this." Id. at 95.
5. See id. at 87.
6. See id at 89-91 (explaining how an attorney received "appointment" from a
litigant or a court).
7. See id at 128-35.
8. See Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (1998).
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Sir William Holdsworth, in his classic and still basic History of Eng-
lish Law, gave extensive coverage of the bar and its evolving role into
the Victorian age. By the early years of the present century, Edward
Thornton had written a treatise on the subject of "Attorneys."'" Thus,
there certainly has been a law of lawyering for at least a century.
THE INVISIBLE LAW OF LAWYERING
Until recently, however, the law of lawyering was generally ignored
by most lawyers."t The subject was not generally taught in law
schools." Indeed, until a couple of decades ago, many law schools
offered at most an optional course or a seminar in professional eth-
ics. 3 Courses that were offered focused on the codified ethics rules,
such as the Canons of Ethics, 4 the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility,' 5 and, more recently, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.16 These courses, while better than nothing, ignored the in-
terconnections of the ethics rules and the larger legal framework.
Some of those interconnections were implicit in the codified rules.
For example, Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules provides that a lawyer
shall not "counsel" or "assist" in conduct that is "criminal" or "fraud-
ulent."' 7 Understanding the Rule requires analysis of the concepts of
accessory liability ("counsel" or "assist") under criminal and tort law,
9. 12 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 4-101 (1938).
10. Edward M. Thornton, A Treatise on Attorneys at Law (1914).
11. See Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, American Bar
Ass'n, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 1 (1970). The
Clark Report described lawyer discipline in 1970 as "scandalous," id., and specifically
identified 36 problems, including the lack of suspension procedures, the movement of
disbarred practitioners to other locales, routine reinstatement of disbarred lawyers,
reluctance of lawyers in small communities to discipline one of their own, and the
undermanning and underfunding of state disciplinary agencies. Id. at 1-2, 19.
12. See James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Re-
placing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 83, 86-87 (1991) (noting that by 1915, "fifty-seven of the eighty-one law
schools offered a course on legal ethics," but "[tlhese lectures were often optional and
their importance was down-played by the law schools"); see also Russell G. Pearce,
Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School,
29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 719, 722-25 (1998) (detailing the disregard within the academic
community for legal ethics").
13. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31,
31 (1992) ("Legal ethics has long been a subject of popular polemics and bar plati-
tudes, but only in the last two decades has it received serious academic treatment.");
see also Pearce, supra note 12, at 722 (noting that in the 1950s, "most ethics courses
'consisted of only one hour of ungraded instruction each week' (quoting Rhode,
supra, at 36)).
14. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908).
15. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1971).
16. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1981).
17. The Rule provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
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as well as the criminal and civil concepts of fraud itself." Yet most
courses and course books on professional responsibility did not ad-
dress those issues. Moreover, in my experience on the faculties of sev-
eral law schools, the concepts of accessorial liability and the vague
contours of "fraud" typically went unexamined, or were examined
only cursorily, in the other courses taken by the students, such as Torts
or Corporation Law. Hence, in most law schools, there was little or
no discussion of these key limits of the law under which a lawyer is
supposed to function.
Another example of the interconnection between lawyer conduct
and the requirements of law is explicit in Rules 3.1 and 3.4 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct concerning the obligations of
litigation counsel.19 Rule 3.1 refers to restrictions on frivolous litiga-
tion, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. °
Hence, Rule 3.1 poses the difficult question of whether a given "lead-
ing edge" legal claim or defense is within the protective umbrella of a
"good faith" contention or outside that protection.21 Rule 3.4 imposes
various restrictions on "macho" litigating tactics, but those restric-
tions are not independently defined in that Rule. Instead, Rule 3.4
counsel a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (1995). The key terms. "counsel,"
"assist," "criminal" and "fraudulent" are carried over from the Code of Professional
Responsibility. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(7)
(1980) (providing that a lawyer shall not "[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent").
18. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 Fordham L Rev.
327, 355-60 (1998); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a
Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 Miami L. Rev. 669, 675-76 (1981) ("DR 7-
102(A)(7) ... expressly invites our attention to general law by using the term
'illegal."').
19. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions); id. Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel).
20. Compare id. Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law."), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(b) ("[Presentation to the court by an
attorney of any motion or other paper certifies that] the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
lav[.]").
21. One of the leading cases on this issue under Rule 11 is Golden Eagle Distribut-
ing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), sua sponte request for
reh'g en banc denied, 809 F.2d 584 (1987). See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and tile Pro-
fession, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 589, 630-31 (1998) (discussing Golden Eagle).
22. Specifically, Rule 3.4 provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evi-
dentiary value.... ;
(b) falisfy evidence...;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal... ;
19981
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incorporates by reference the legal rules against concealment of evi-
dence, falsifying evidence, illegal trial tactics, and so on.2 3 In teaching
professional ethics, however, there was a tendency to pass lightly over
specific distinctions-for example, between declining to offer damag-
ing evidence to an opponent and failing to come forth with damaging
evidence when procedural law so requires, as under our discovery
rules.24 Other rules incorporated into Rule 3.4, and the specifics of
procedural law which they incorporate, were often similarly bypassed.
Other interconnections between the codified ethics rules and the
larger legal framework are implicit. Perhaps the most important of
these interconnections is in Rule 1.13, which addresses a lawyer's rep-
resentation of an organization.25 A large majority of lawyers repre-
sent corporations some of the time and many lawyers represent
corporations all the time.2 6 Corporate law is very clear on the propo-
sition that the corporate entity is a legal personality, distinct from its
officers and employees.2 7 As a matter of corporate law, therefore,
corporate officers and employees are mere agents of the corporate
entity.28 Although this proposition had long ago been applied in the
context of relationships between lawyer and corporation,2 9 some law-
yers still fail to appreciate the implications of this distinction.30 In my
observation as a law teacher, many students graduate without a clue
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery
request by an opposing party;
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably be-
lieve is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence ... ; or
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving
relevant information to another party ....
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4.
23. See id.
24. An interesting judicial encounter with the law concerning spoliation of evi-
dence, as applied to conduct of lawyers, is Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114
(Pa. Super. 1986). That the law against spoliation of evidence (the weapon in a mur-
der case) should be applied to criminal defense counsel seemed to dumbfound the
court as much as it dumbfounded the lawyers who committed the spoliation. Id. at
124-25.
25. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client).
26. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal.
1994) (In Bank) ("According to a study conducted in the early 1980's, 50,000 lawyers
were on corporate payrolls, a figure double that of 15 years earlier; a more recent
survey indicates that more than 10 percent of all lawyers in the United States are
employed in-house by corporations." (note omitted)).
27. 1 James D. Cox et. al., Corporations §§ 7.1, 8.1, at 7.2, 8.1-.2 (1998).
28. Id. § 8.1, at 8.1-.2.
29. See, e.g., Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that a
lawyer who worked with an officer of a corporation while representing the corpora-
tion did not have an attorney-client relationship with the officer and could therefore
represent the corporation in a suit against the officer).
30. See, e.g., In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. and Loan Sec. Litig.,
794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (rejecting a law firm's argument that "corpo-
rate representation often involves the distinct interests of affiliated entities" and reaf-
firming that "[ain attorney who represents a corporation has a duty to act in the
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as to its significance and hence enter corporate practice unaware that
when the lawyer is employed by corporation, corporate officials are
not clients in the strict sense of that term.'
Instruction in professional ethics is now much improved. Courses in
legal ethics are universally required and there is a growing number of
increasingly good casebooks32 and of scholars with wider perspectives.
We also now have a Restatement on the subject.33
Nevertheless, many lawyers remain ignorant of, or insensitive to,
basic rules of ethics. Particularly persistent is ignorance of or insensi-
tivity towards the rules of conflict of interest, including the rules
whereby the conflict of one lawyer is imputed to the other lawyers in a
firm through a concept of agency law.34 As my colleague Professor
Susan Koniak and I have previously observed, part of the reason for
this attitude is that the law schools have not taught professional re-
sponsibility as "real" law.35 Another contributing cause, in my opin-
ion, is the mechanical approach to legal ethics in the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination.36
There are perhaps two other factors that contribute to the difficulty
that many lawyers have in recognizing and appropriately responding
to the law of lawyering. One factor is the historical legacy that the
norms of lawyer conduct have been considered a matter of "ethics"
rather than of law. A related factor is one that might be called
viewpoint.
corporation's best interest when confronted by adverse interests of directors, officers,
or corporate affiliates").
31. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(a) ("A lawyer employed
or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly au-
thorized constituents." (emphasis added)).
32. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Professional Responsibility: Problems of Practice
and the Profession (1996); Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law
and Ethics (5th ed. 1998); Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and
Materials on Professional Responsibility (6th ed. 1995); John T. Noonan, Jr. & Rich-
ard W. Painter, Professional and Personal Responsibilities of the Lawyer (1997).
33. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, 1998); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
34. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.9-.12.
35. See Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs,
L. & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 117, 117 ("Legal ethics remains the
step-child of legal education.... And at most schools the 'pervasive method,' in
which legal ethics is integrated into the standard coursework, is still little more than
tokenism.. .. ")
36. See Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 Ky. L.J. 395,397 (1998) (stat-
ing that the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination "has unintentionally
trivialized the subject [of legal ethics] because it tests hypothetical standards, its range
is very limited, and it covers some topics irrelevant to all but a tiny percentage of
lawyers").
1998]
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LAWYER NORMS AS "MERE ETHics"
The legal profession's traditional understanding has been that the
norms governing lawyer conduct were rules of ethics. In 1908, the
norms the American Bar Association promulgated were Canons of
Professional Ethics.37 The ABA Canons were built on the foundation
of a code promulgated in Alabama,38 which was also formulated as a
statement of ethical norms and which in turn was derived from lec-
tures on ethics by David Hoffman and George Sharswood.39 It was
only in 1970, through the ABA promulgation of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility,4" that the organized profession came to
regard the norms to include legal obligations-i.e., the obligations
stated as Disciplinary Rules.4'
By the same token, the traditional mechanism of enforcement was
understood by the profession to be the disciplinary procedure of a
grievance committee.42 A grievance committee was a fraternal body
whose office was visualized as that of chastising lapsed brothers.43 As
I read the historical record, if a lawyer did really bad things, such as
repeatedly stealing from clients, the way the system usually worked
was that the local bar collectively and informally arrived at a decision
that "something had to be done" about the miscreant-a decision that
expressed ethical norms rather than applied legal standards.44 There-
upon, the offender was brought before a grievance tribunal whose ver-
dict was implicitly foreordained.45 Thus, the norms governing lawyers
37. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908).
38. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the
Alabama State Bar Association, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 471, 505 (1998) ("Virtually all of the
thirty-two original Canons derive from one of the fifty-six provisions of the Alabama
Code of Ethics [of 1887].").
39. See id. at 498 ("The influence of Hoffman and Sharswood is clearly visible in
the code."); id. at 504 ("[T]he Alabama Code of Ethics adopts the lofty sentiments
and assumptions about shared norms reflected in the writings of Sharswood and Hoff-
man."); Russel G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 243-47 (1992) (discussing the role of Sharswood's
work in the development of legal ethics codes); see also Marston, supra note 38, at
493-97 (providing background information about Hoffman and Sharswood); Pearce,
supra, at 248-58 (discussing Sharswood's vision of legal ethics).
40. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980).
41. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239,
1249-60 (1991) (discussing this transformation).
42. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in
the United States, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 911, 919-20 (1994).
43. See id. at 919.
44. For an analysis of the empirical and functional differences between "ethics"
and legal rules, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 So. I11. U.
L.J. 447, 448, 451, 453 (1995) [hereinafter Hazard, Law, Morals, and Ethics] (defining
separately "law," which is norms formally promulgated from a political authority,
"morals," which are subjective notions of right and wrong, and "ethics," which are
shared norms based on reciprocal recognition).
45. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Cameron Beardley, A Lawyer's Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings, 96 Yale L.J. 1060,
1063 (1987) (stating that in a disbarment proceeding, "the burden of proof was on the
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were considered substantively as something less than law and proce-
durally as enforceable through an informal procedure maintained by
colleagues.46
In these terms, the norms of lawyer conduct were certainly not
"law," at least as we currently understand it-rules formulated with
the precision of a legal code, enforced through a procedure itself hav-
ing similar precision.47 Moreover, in recent years, enforcement of the
norms often occurs outside the grievance machinery. 48 The law gov-
erning lawyers, including that codified in the ethics codes, is now typi-
cally enforced by courts in proceedings for disqualification and cost
sanctions.4 9 The courts, of course, are constitutionally required to
function on the basis of substantive legal rules, administered through
procedural legal rules. Hence, the rules of "ethics" have effectively
become law governing lawyers.5 0
THE PROBLEM OF VIEWPOINT
The fact that the norms of lawyer conduct have become "legalized"
poses a problem of viewpoint. Stated simply, a lawyer's viewpoint of
"law" when the lawyer is providing representation of a client is quite
different from her viewpoint of law as it is applied to herself as a
lawyer.
A lawyer's viewpoint in representing clients includes the viewpoints
of the advocate and of the office counselor or transaction lawyer. The
advocate contemplates how the legal system is likely to respond to the
client's cause. In this context, the legal system includes the opposing
party, the opposing party's counsel, the court, the jury in a jury-triable
case, and possibly others. How these players interact will determine
the operative effect-the "cash value"-of the legal system to the cli-
ent. It is this viewpoint which Oliver Wendell Holmes evidently had
attorney to prove his innocence"). In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), however, the
Supreme Court held that grievance proceedings had to meet minimum Due Process
standards. Id. at 550. That decision was an important step in the procedural transfor-
mation of the norms of lawyer conduct from "ethics" into law.
46. See Devlin, supra note 42, at 918-19 (stating that early bar associations were
concerned with "good fellowship," and also informally disciplined their members).
47. See Hazard, Law, Morals, and Ethics, supra note 44, at 454-55 (differentiating
between law and ethics on the ground that ethical norms are developed through trans-
actions between relevant community actors, and that law, once promulgated, is com-
mitted to applying itself to the same facts in similar ways).
48. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Attorney Malpractice and tie Structure of Negli-
gence Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 649, 662-81 (1998) (discussing the application of tort
law to lawyer malpractice). See generally Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal
Malpractice (4th ed. 1996).
49. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 71 (1996) (discussing judicial responses to attorneys' conflicts of
interest). An injunction remedy through an independent suit may also be available.
See Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Pa. 1992).
50. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 5-7 (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft No. 2, 1998) (cataloging remedies and sanctions).
1998]
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in mind when he remarked that law is what "the courts will to do in
fact."51 This viewpoint is from an "external" position, where the law-
yer makes a calculation of behavioral probabilities in the legal system
considered as a whole. From this viewpoint, the lawyer addresses
whether and how far she can maneuver within the system in a direc-
tion favorable to the client.
The viewpoint of the office counselor or transaction lawyer is also
external, but one step removed. The lawyer as counselor gives advice
based on a calculation of behavioral probabilities as to whether the
legal system will actually be mobilized against the client and, if so, on
what terms. Put crudely, the legal question for the office counselor
may be whether the client can "get away with" pursuing a contem-
plated course of action. This viewpoint is what Holmes evidently had
in mind in his projection of the viewpoint of the "bad man": "If you
want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowl-
edge enables him to predict [what the courts will do in fact] ... "52
I put to one side the complicated issue of the extent to which the
lawyer as advocate or as counselor may (or should) consider moral
and ethical issues in addition to or beyond the law.53 In my opinion, it
is impossible for anyone, including a lawyer, to look at the law simply
as a bad man would, i.e., to "know the law and nothing else."' 54 Even
bad men have consciousness going beyond the law. Lawyers are peo-
ple before they attend law school, and most of them continue to be
such after entering the practice.55 We cannot forget what we learned
as children56 or what each of us has learned from the totality of our
individual experience. Because lawyers know these things as people,
lawyers cannot "unknow" them in our professional capacity.
Nevertheless, at least theoretically one can comprehend how a law-
yer might seek to provide a client advice based solely on the law, with-
out regard to other normative considerations such as morals, ethics,
51. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).
52. Id. at 459.
53. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1995) (stating that
a lawyer may withdraw if client insists on pursuing repugnant objective); id. Rule 2.1
(stating that a lawyer may refer to moral factors in giving legal advice).
54. See Holmes, supra note 51, at 459.
55. See Simon Yeznig Balian, Personal Responsibility for Professional Actions, 32
Cath. Law. 337, 352 (1989) (stating that by the time of a person's law school entrance,
he or she has already formed the moral character necessary to act morally). Consider
John Dean's admission: "I must say that I knew that the things I was doing were
wrong, and one learns the difference between right and wrong long before one enters
law school. A course on legal ethics wouldn't have changed anything." Thomas Lick-
ona, What Does Moral Psychology Have to Say to the Teacher of Ethics? in Ethics
Teaching in Higher Education 103, 129 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds. 1980)
(quoting John Dean).
56. See Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten:
Uncommon Thoughts on Common Things (1989).
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public opinion, etc. One can similarly comprehend a client asking, or
even demanding, that a lawyer confine the professional advice to
those limits. That is, we can imagine a differentiation in the communi-
cations among lawyers and clients between "the law" and "else," even
while recognizing that such a differentiation is physiologically impossi-
ble in a single mind, even a legal mind.
Even imagining such a differentiation, however, presupposes two
minds involved in structured and controlled communication. On one
hand, the lawyer articulates to the client only "the law and nothing
else" and, on the other hand, the client obtains from the lawyer only
"the law and nothing else." This presupposition, however, does not
entail that the lawyer actually have in mind only "the law and nothing
else," nor that the client as a result of the communication contemplate
"only the law and nothing else." On the contrary, both lawyer and
client well know-whatever each might privately acknowledge or sig-
nal each other-that there is a great deal "else" in their respective
cognitive and behavioral positions.57
The situation is very different with the law governing lawyers.
There can be no presupposition of two participants in structured and
controlled communication with each other, because there is in fact
only one mind at work. The articulation of "the law" is performed by
the lawyer himself, to himself as client, in his own mind. A conceptu-
alization by the lawyer that he is "giving legal advice to himself," in
the same sense as in giving advice to a client, is absurd or schizo-
phrenic. In addressing one's self, it is a physical impossibility for a
human mind, even a legal mind, to think in terms of "the law and
nothing else." Hence, a lawyer, in dealing with the law governing law-
yers, cannot simply "think like a lawyer."' 8
The realization that a lawyer cannot think like a lawyer when ad-
dressing his own legal duties leads to one obvious conclusion: A law-
yer confronting something that seems to be an ethics problem should
consult a colleague about whether there is such a problem and, if so,
how she should go about resolving it. Thus, the very objectivity that
we lawyers say is part of what we bring to clients' problems should
also be brought to our own.
57. For example, economics or politics may enter into a client's decision. See
George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 273, 278-79 (1998) (noting that clients may be motivated by eco-
nomic self-interest); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the
Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 Fordham L
Rev. 569, 570-71 (1998) (discussing lawyers' representation of the NAACP in civil
rights cases.
58. See Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It". "'Ethical" Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 523, 560 (1998) (arguing that lawyers should
not disregard racist and sexist tendencies in prospective jurors despite our law's color-
blind aspirations).
1998]
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This Symposium breaks down the barrier between the "mere eth-
ics" of lawyer norms and "real" law and the barrier between the view-
points of the lawyer-with-client and the lawyer-as-client. "Real" law",
other than ethics, influences lawyer behavior in a myriad of ways.59
Conversely, lawyer norms influence how lawyers apply "real" law to
themselves.6 ° Similarly, legal theories usually applied to "real" law
can also be applied to ethical rules, 61 and theories of legal ethics can
be used to explain lawyers' influence on "real" law.
62
Perhaps, in time, lawyer norms, and thus the law of lawyering, will
enjoy equal status with other areas of law in both the law schools and
among practitioners. Until then, we must seize every opportunity, like
this Symposium, to explore the interconnectedness of the law, legal
theory, and the legal profession.
59. See, e.g., Green, supra note 18 (discussing the application of criminal law to
lawyers); Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession,
67 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (1998) (discussing the application of partnership law to law-
yers); Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 415 (1998) (discussing the application of antitrust law to lawyers);
Zipursky, supra note 48 (discussing the application of tort law to lawyers).
60. See, e.g., Deborah A. Demott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 301
(1998) (discussing differences in the way agency law is applied to lawyers as compared
to other professions); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different,
67 Fordham L. Rev. 443 (1998) (discussing differences in the way contract law is ap-
plied to lawyers as compared to others); Smith, supra note 58 (discussing how ethical
concerns may prompt defense lawyers to evade restrictions on using preemptory chal-
lenges based on race or gender); Sullivan, supra note 57 (discussing various arguments
that lawyers' speech should receive less First Amendment protection than others'
speech): Vairo, supra note 21 (discussing how lawyers reacted to the promulgation of
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